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our­own­decisions­but­ also­by­ the­decisions­of ­







trying­ to­meet­a­ friend­ in­a­busy­mall,­ to­ large-
scale­ international­ conflicts,­ such­ as­ the­ former­
Cold­ War­ between­ the­ USA­ and­ the­ Soviet­
Union.­These­ situations­ all­ have­ an­ element­ of ­





communication,­ the­ different­ parties­ may­ very­
Social Information as a Cue  
for Tacit Coordination
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Abstract
Whereas­earlier­research­on­tacit­coordination­has­mainly­demonstrated­how­people­use­environmental­
information­ to­ achieve­ coordination­ success,­ the­ present­ research­ investigates­ how­ people­ tacitly­
coordinate­their­decisions­by­using­information­about­the­people­they­have­to­coordinate­with­(i.e.,­




there­ is­ a­ clear­ association­ between­ such­ information­ and­ the­ available­ choice­ options­ (Study­ 3).­
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Cremer,­2009).­In­his­famous­book­The Strategy of  
Conflict­ (1960),­ the­Nobel­ Prize-winning­ econo-
mist­Thomas­C.­Schelling­was­the­first­to­address­
this­ concept.­ He­ argued­ that­ people­ are­ often­
capable­of ­ tacitly­ coordinating­ their­ actions.­To­
illustrate­this­phenomenon­of ­tacit­coordination,­





his­ research­ participants­ this­ question,­most­ of ­
them­ indicated­ that­ they­ would­ go­ to­ Grand­
Central­Station,­at­12.00­noon.­If ­they­indeed­did­
act­ accordingly­ in­ such­ a­ situation,­ this­ would­
mean­that­they­would­be­able­to­meet­the­other­
person,­and­that­tacit­coordination­would­thus­be­





Stasser,­ 2008;­ Bacharach­ &­ Bernasconi,­ 1997;­
Camerer,­ 2003),­ such­ as­ “write­ some­ positive­
number“,­ “choose­ a­ color“,­ etc.­ In­most­ cases,­
people­were­highly­capable­of ­ tacitly­coordinat-
ing­ their­ decisions­ by­ both­ choosing­ the­ most­
salient­ option­ (e.g.,­most­ participants­ chose­ the­
number­1­when­they­had­to­write­the­same­posi-
tive­number;­also­see­Mehta,­Starmer,­&­Sugden,­
1994).­These­ simple­matching­ games­ thus­ illus-
trate­that­people­are­often­capable­of ­effectively­
coordinating­their­decisions,­even­when­commu-
nication­ is­ impossible,­ by­basing­ their­ decisions­
on­salient­cues­in­the­task­environment­(i.e.,­envi-
ronmental­information).
But­how­do­people­ identify­what­ is­ a­ salient­
cue­for­tacit­coordination­purposes?­Earlier­stud-
ies­ (e.g.,­ Bacharach­&­Bernasconi,­ 1997;­Mehta­
et­ al.,­ 1994;­ Schelling,­ 1960)­ have­ consistently­
shown­ that­ if ­ people­ have­ to­ choose­ the­ same­
option­(also­referred­to­as­matching),­they­often­
decide­ to­choose­ the­one­option­ that­ sticks­out­
from­the­ rest,­ such­as­Grand­Central­Station­ in­
Schelling’s­ New­ York­ City­ example.­ In­ other­
words,­ in­ matching­ situations,­ people­ tend­ to­
choose­ the­ most­ salient­ or­ prominent­ option­
(Colman,­ 2006;­ Sugden­ &­ Zamarron,­ 2006).­
From­this­literature,­one­may­be­inclined­to­con-
clude­that­salience­is­only­determined­by­the­envi-










the­ task­ itself,­but­ also­ social­ information­about­




options­ and,­ consequently,­ the­ choice­ behavior­
that­ derives­ from­ such­ salience.­ In­other­words,­
we­argue­that­social­information­may­serve­as­an­
effective­ cue­ for­ tacit­ coordination.­ Surprisingly,­

















thought­ experiment.­ Imagine­ two­ psychology­
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both­ focus­on­what­ they­have­ in­common­with­




by­ meeting­ at­ the­ library­ of ­ the­ psychology­
department.­Likewise,­ if ­ two­ law­ students­want­
to­study­together,­they­may­tacitly­coordinate­by­
going­to­the­library­of ­the­law­faculty.­This­simple­
example­ illustrates­ that­ when­ people­ base­ their­
matching­ decision­ on­ the­ choice­ option­ that­ is­
associated­ with­ their­ shared­ characteristic,­ this­
may­indeed­lead­to­successful­tacit­coordination.
But­what­should­people­do­when­they­have­to­
match­ their­ decisions­ and­ they­ cannot­ use­ the­
above­ strategy­ to­ achieve­ successful­ matching­
because­ the­ relevant­ characteristic­ is­ unshared?­
How­do­they­then­identify­the­most­appropriate­
choice­to­make?­For­instance,­what­if ­a­psychol-
ogy­ student­ and­ a­ law­ student­were­ to­ face­ the­
tacit­coordination­problem­about­where­to­study?­
If ­ each­ student­ were­ then­ to­ go­ to­ their­ own­
library,­they­would­certainly­not­be­able­to­meet.­
In­ the­ case­ of ­ unshared­ characteristics,­ people­
should­thus­adopt­an­alternative­strategy­to­match­
their­decisions.­ In­ that­ case,­ they­ should­go­ for­
the­most­appropriate­“neutral”­option.­More­spe-





biguous­ solution,­ and­ thus­ leads­ to­ successful­
coordination,­if ­there­is­one­such­neutral­option.­
Thus,­knowledge­about­which­characteristics­are­
unshared—by­ indicating­ which­ choice­ options­
should­ be­ avoided—can­ also­ be­ used­ to­match­
decisions.­Although­ the­ above­ reasoning­ seems­




cle­ is­ to­ investigate­ whether­ people­ actually­
employ­ the­ above-described­ strategies­ to­ tacitly­
match­ their­ decisions­ (Study­ 1:­ Social­ informa-
tion­in­matching­games).





tacit­ coordination—including­ Schelling’s­ own­
work—has­ mainly­ focused­ on­ matching­ situa-
tions­ (see­ e.g.,­ Bacharach­ &­ Bernasconi,­ 1997;­
Crawford,­Gneezy,­&­Rottenstreich,­2008;­Mehta­
et­al.,­1994).­In­many­real-life­coordination­situa-
tions,­ however,­ it­ is­ not­ required­ that­ people­
match­ their­ decisions,­ but­ that­ they­ mismatch­
their­ choices­ (Abele­ &­ Stasser,­ 2008;­ Arthur,­








home.­Another­ smaller-scale­ example­of ­ a­mis-
matching­situation­occurs­when­you­are­invited­to­
a­ birthday­ party­ and­ you­ have­ to­ decide­which­




ples,­ see­ Abele­ &­ Stasser,­ 2008),­ very­ little­ is­
known­about­how­people­coordinate­ their­deci-
sions­ in­ such­ situations.­Mismatching­ situations­
are­psychologically­different­from­matching­situ-
ations.­ After­ all,­ in­ contrast­ to­ matching­ situa-
tions,­in­mismatching­situations­it­is­not­sufficient­




to­ achieve­ coordination­ success­ in­mismatching­
situations?­Our­suggestion­is­that­they­can,­but­not­
by­ focusing­ on­ the­ sharedness­ of ­ one­ another’s­
characteristics.­ Instead,­ when­ mismatching­ is­
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required,­we­argue­that­the­unsharedness­of ­char-
acteristics­may­be­instrumental­to­achieving­suc-
cessful­ tacit­ coordination.­That­ is,­when­people­
know­ that­ they­ are­ different­ from­one­ another,­
they­may­focus­on­this­unsharedness­as­a­means­
to­successfully­mismatch­their­choices.­More­spe-
cifically,­ they­may­ try­ to­achieve­successful­mis-




an­ exam­but­ they­want­ to­ study­ separately­ (for­
instance,­ because­ they­ realize­ that­ they­ would­
only­ distract­ one­ another­ if ­ they­ try­ to­ study­











The association between social 









there­ is­ a­clear­association­between­ the­kind­of ­
social­information­people­have­(e.g.,­information­





choice­ options­ may­ not­ be­ so­ clear-cut.­ For­
instance,­ if ­ you­ want­ to­ meet­ another­ person­




about­ the­ other­ person.­ For­ instance,­ you­may­
not­only­know­that­the­other­person­is­a­woman,­
but­also­ that­ she­ studies­psychology.­ If ­ you­are­
required­to­coordinate­decisions­with­this­person,­
you­may­ not­ necessarily­ use­ all­ these­ pieces­ of ­
social­ information­ to­ reach­ a­ decision.­ Instead,­
you­ may­ only­ use­ those­ pieces­ of ­ information­
that—by­ being­ associated­ with­ the­ available­
choice­ options—can­ give­ you­ clear­ cues­ about­
which­decision­to­make.­If,­for­instance,­you­are­
required­to­meet­another­student­at­a­University­




woman.­ In­ such­ instances,­ we­ hypothesize­ that­
people­ will­ only­ focus­ on­ those­ characteristics­
that­ are­ associated­ with­ the­ available­ choice­









ness­ of ­ tacit­ coordination,­ with­ the­ common­
theme­being­that­social­information,­in­combina-
tion­with­the­requirements­for­coordination­suc-
cess­ (i.e.,­ matching­ or­ mismatching),­ may­
determine­which­options­people­choose­in­coordi-
nation­situations.­Our­ line­of ­reasoning­ is­based­
on­ the­ idea­ that­people­will­ try­ to­choose­ those­
options­ that,­ given­ the­ information­ they­ have­
about­ their­ co-players­ and­ the­ coordination­
requirements,­increase­their­chances­of ­success.­In­
a­similar­vein,­one­could­argue­that­if ­decisions­are­
indeed­ based­ on­ such­ expectancies­ of ­ success,­
people­may­ also­ select­ coordination­ partners­ in­
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such­a­way­that­their­chances­of ­success­are­maxi-
mized.­That­is,­when­faced­with­a­matching­task,­
people­might­prefer­partners­who­ are­ similar­ to­
themselves,­ whereas­ in­ a­mismatching­ task­ they­
might­ prefer­ partners­ who­ are­ different.­
Interestingly,­ this­ issue­ of ­ partner­ selection­ has­








whether­people­ use­ the­ sharedness­ (rather­ than­
unsharedness)­ of ­ individual­ characteristics­ as­ a­
cue­to­tacitly­match­their­decisions.­In­Study­2,­we­
focus­ on­ mismatching­ situations,­ and­ we­ test­
whether­people­use­the­unsharedness­(rather­than­
sharedness)­of ­individual­characteristics­as­a­cue­
for­ mismatching.­ Furthermore,­ in­ Study­ 3,­ we­
investigate­ the­ boundary­ conditions­ of ­ these­
effects­by­testing­our­idea­that­social­information­
only­serves­as­an­effective­cue­for­tacit­coordina-
tion­ when­ there­ is­ a­ clear­ association­ between­
such­information­and­the­available­choice­options.­
Finally,­ in­Study­4,­we­address­the­issue­of ­how­
people­ choose­ their­ coordination­ partners.­ By­
doing­so,­we­can­test­whether­people­have­a­pref-









communicate­ with­ one­ another­ (cf.­ Schelling,­
1960).­Based­on­our­reasoning,­we­formulate­the­
following­ two­ hypotheses.­ First,­we­ expect­ that­
when­ a­ certain­ characteristic­ is­ shared­ among­
players­of ­a­matching­game,­they­will­most­often­





acteristics,­ and­ choose­ a­ neutral­ option­ instead­
(Hypothesis­2).
Method




Procedure­ The­ participants­ were­ invited­ to­
participate­ in­ a­ study­ on­ “decision­ making”.­
Upon­arrival­at­the­laboratory­they­were­seated­in­
separate­ cubicles,­ each­ containing­ a­ personal­













neutral­color.­Participants­were­told­that­ if ­ they­
succeeded­ in­ both­ picking­ the­ same­ color,­ they­
would­ have­ a­ chance­ of ­ winning­ a­ monetary­
amount­of ­€­20.
Participants­were­randomly­assigned­to­three­
experimental­ conditions­ (Social­ Information:­
Shared­Characteristic­vs.­Unshared­Characteristic­
vs.­ Control).­ In­ the­ Shared­ and­ the­ Unshared­
Characteristic­ conditions,­ participants­ received­
bogus­information­about­the­first­name­of ­their­
co-player.­The­name­Johan­was­used­to­indicate­a­
male­ co-player­ whereas­ the­ name­ Johanna­ was­
used­to­indicate­a­female­co-player.­Both­of ­these­
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names­are­quite­common­in­The­Netherlands,­the­
former­ one­ being­ unambiguously­male­ and­ the­
latter­ one­ being­ unambiguously­ female.­ Thus,­
although­we­did­not­explicitly­tell­them­whether­
their­ co-player­was­male­ or­ female,­ participants­
could­infer­their­co-player’s­sex­from­his/her­first­
name.­Additionally,­participants­were­asked­to­fill­




of ­ the­ same­ sex­ as­ they­ themselves.­ In­ the­
Unshared­Characteristic­condition,­ the­name­of ­
the­co-player­indicated­that­this­co-player­was­of ­
the­ opposite­ sex­ than­ they­ were;­ and­ in­ the­
Control­condition­no­information­was­exchanged­
between­ the­ two­ players,­ so­ participants­ were­
unaware­of ­the­sex­of ­their­co-player.­Note­that­
this­ latter­condition­(i.e.,­ the­Control­condition)­
closely­ resembles­ the­ procedure­ used­ in­ earlier­




lasted­ about­ 20­ minutes,­ all­ participants­ were­
debriefed,­ thanked­ and­ paid­ equally­ for­ their­
participation­(i.e.,­each­participant­received­€­3).­
Furthermore,­three­prizes­of ­€­20­were­randomly­
allotted­ among­ the­participants.­All­ participants­
agreed­to­this­payment­procedure.
Results
Manipulation check­ To­ check­ whether­ par-
ticipants­ had­ understood­ the­ experimental­
manipulation,­afterwards­they­were­asked­to­indi-
cate­whether­their­co-player­was­a­man,­a­woman­




remembered­ the­ social­ information­ they­ had­
been­given.
The participants’ choices­ To­test­our­hypoth-
eses,­ we­ first­ recoded­ the­ participants’­ choices­
into­ three­categories,­namely­ into­ (a)­sex-typical­
choices­(i.e.,­pink­for­women­and­blue­for­men);­
(b)­sex-atypical­choices­(i.e.,­blue­for­women­and­




expected,­ there­ was­ indeed­ a­ significant­ differ-
ence­between­the­three­conditions,­χ2­(4,­N­=­97)­
=­25.23,­p­<­.001.­As­predicted­by­Hypothesis­1,­
participants­ in­ the­ Shared­ Characteristic­ condi-
tion­chose­their­sex-typical­color­most­frequently,­
namely­18­out­of ­32­times,­χ2­(2,­N­=­32)­=­7.56,­
p­ <­ .05.­ As­ predicted­ by­ Hypothesis­ 2,­ in­ the­
Unshared­Characteristic­condition­the­sex-neutral­
option­ was­ chosen­ most­ frequently,­ namely­ 23­
out­of ­32­times,­χ2­(2,­N­=­32)­=­22.56,­p­<­.001.­
And­finally,­in­the­Control­condition­the­sex-neu-






tion­ participants­ most­ frequently­ chose­ their­
Table 1.­ Study­1:­matching:­number­of ­choices­for­sex-typical,­sex-neutral­and­sex-atypical­colors­in­the­three­
experimental­conditions
Conditions Choices
­ Sex-typical­color Sex-neutral­color Sex-atypical­color
Shared­sex­(n­=­32) 18 7 7
Unshared­sex­(n­=­32 2 23 7
Control­condition­(n­=­33) 6 21 6
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sex-typical­color­(Hypothesis­1),­in­the­Unshared­
Category­Membership­condition­ the­sex-neutral­





teristics­ plays­ a­ key­ role­ in­ this­ process.­ Only­
when­ a­ characteristic­ is­ shared,­ do­ the­ options­
that­are­associated­with­this­characteristic­become­
salient­ as­ a­ cue­ for­ matching.­ However,­ when­
players­ do­ not­ share­ characteristics,­ players­will­
opt­ for­ more­ category-neutral­ choices­ instead­
(for­other­research­showing­that­players­coordi-




have­ information­ about­ one­ another’s­ sex,­ par-
ticipants­also­chose­the­sex-neutral­option­most­
frequently.­We­believe­that­ this­might­be­due­to­
the­ fact­ that­ this­ sex-neutral­ option­ was­ posi-
tioned­ in­ the­middle­ (i.e.,­ in­ between­ the­ other­
two­colors),­possibly­making­it­a­focal­point­for­
coordination­ (cf.­ Schelling,­ 1960).­ This­ also­
implies­that­participants­ in­the­Unshared­condi-
tion­may­have­chosen­this­option­not­because­it­
was­ sex-neutral,­ but­because­of ­ its­ spatial­posi-
tioning.­Related­ to­ this,­ it­ should­be­noted­ that,­
although­ the­ majority­ of ­ participants­ clearly­













teristic­ is­unshared­ among­players,­ and­ they­ are­
required­ to­ mismatch­ their­ decisions,­ they­ will­
most­often­choose­ the­option­ that­ is­associated­
with­ their­ own­ characteristic­ (Hypothesis­ 3).­
Second,­ we­ expect­ that­ when­ players­ share­ the­
same­ characteristic­ or­ when­ characteristics­ are­
unknown,­this­will­not­help­them­to­identify­the­
option­ that­ they­ should­ choose­ to­ achieve­ suc-
cessful­mismatching.­Prior­studies­on­tacit­coor-
dination­in­social­dilemmas­(e.g.,­De­Kwaadsteniet,­
Van­ Dijk,­ Wit,­ &­ De­ Cremer,­ 2006;­ De­
Kwaadsteniet,­ Van­ Dijk,­ Wit,­ De­ Cremer,­ &­
De­Rooij,­ 2007;­Van­Dijk,­De­Kwaadsteniet,­&­
De­Cremer,­2009)­have­shown­that­when­unam-











Procedure­ The­ experimental­ procedure­ of ­
this­ second­ study­was­ almost­ identical­ to­ the­
procedure­of ­the­first­one.­The­only­difference­
was­that­in­Study­2­participants­were­told­that­
if ­ they­ succeeded­ in­ both­ picking­ a­ different­
color­(i.e.,­they­were­asked­to­mismatch),­they­
would­ have­ a­ chance­ of ­ winning­ a­ monetary­
amount­of ­€­20.­Again,­participants­were­ran-
domly­ assigned­ to­ the­ three­ experimental­
conditions.
Results
Manipulation check­ To­ check­ whether­ par-
ticipants­ had­ understood­ the­ experimental­
manipulation,­afterwards­they­were­asked­to­indi-
cate­ if ­ their­ co-player­ was­ a­man,­ a­ woman­ or­
whether­ they­had­not­ received­ information­ that­
was­ indicative­of ­ the­ sex­of ­ their­ co-player.­All­
participants­ answered­ this­ question­ correctly,­
which­indicates­that­they­had­all­understood­and­
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remembered­ the­ social­ information­ they­ had­
been­given.
The participants’ choices­ To­ test­ our­ first­
two­ hypotheses,­ we­ again­ recoded­ the­ partici-
pants’­choices­into­three­categories,­namely­into­




significant­ difference­ between­ the­ three­ condi-
tions,­χ2­=­(4,­N­=­89)­=­17.29,­p­<­.01,­indicating­
that­ our­ experimental­ manipulation­ indeed­
affected­the­choices­of ­the­participants.­In­keep-
ing­ with­ Hypothesis­ 3,­ participants­ in­ the­






pants’­ decisions­ and­no­option­was­ chosen­ sig-
nificantly­more­often­than­any­other­option­(both­
χ2­ s­ <­ 1;­ both­ ps­ >­ .65).­ To­ summarize,­ these­
analyses­show­that­our­two­hypotheses­were­sup-
ported­by­the­data.
Additional analyses: matching versus mis-
matching­ Although­ the­ hypotheses­ we­ for-
mulated­ pertained­ either­ to­ matching­
(Hypotheses­ 1­ and­ 2)­ or­ to­ mismatching­
(Hypotheses­3­and­4),­ the­ reasoning­presented­
in­our­theoretical­introduction­also­implies­that­
players’­ choices­ should­ be­ different­ depending­
on­whether­they­are­required­to­match­or­mis-
match­ their­ decisions.­ In­ order­ to­ investigate­






.05,­ a­ significant­ main­ effect­ of ­ Coordination­
Requirement,­χ2­(1,­N­=­186)­=­11.45,­p­<­.001,­
and­a­significant­Social­Information­by­Coordi-
nation­ Requirement­ interaction­ effect,­ χ2>­ (2,­
N­ =­ 186)­ =­ 24.82,­ p­ <­ .001.­ The­ latter­ two­
effects­indeed­indicate­that­the­different­coordi-
nation­requirements­had­a­substantial­impact­on­
participants’­ choices,­ and­ that­ the­ effect­ of ­
social­ information­ on­ these­ choices­ largely­
depended­on­the­specific­coordination­require-




eses.­ Whereas­ in­ the­ Unshared­ Category­
Membership­ condition­ participants­ most­ fre-
quently­chose­their­sex-typical­color­(Hypothesis­
3),­ there­ was­ high­ behavioral­ variance­ in­ the­
Shared­Category­Membership­and­in­the­Control­
condition­ (Hypothesis­ 4).­ Note­ that­ this­ high­
behavioral­ variance­ may­ imply­ that­ (a)­ partici-
pants­ had­ no­ idea­ which­ strategy­ to­ use­ and­
therefore­chose­randomly,­or­(b)­that­they­came­
up­ with­ various­ different­ strategies­ to­ achieve­
successful­ mismatching.­ Irrespective­ of ­ their­
underlying­strategies,­however,­the­high­variance­
in­ these­ conditions­ corroborates­ our­ idea­ that­
there­was­no­unambiguous­cue­for­coordination.­
In­ contrast­ to­ when­ matching­ is­ required,­ this­
Table 2.­ Study­2:­mismatching:­number­of ­choices­for­sex-typical,­sex-neutral­and­sex-atypical­colors­in­the­
three­experimental­conditions
Conditions Choices
­ Sex-typical­color Sex-neutral­color Sex-atypical­color
Shared­sex­(n­=­30) 8 10 12
Unshared­sex­(n­=­30) 22 7 1
Control­condition­(n­=­29) 11 10 8
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The­ results­of ­ the­ two­ studies­presented­ above­
corroborate­our­idea­that­social­information­can­
facilitate­tacit­coordination­(i.e.,­matching­as­well­









ing­ game.­ However,­ this­ time­ we­ will­ give­
participants­ information­ about­ two­ individual­
characteristics­ of ­ their­ co-player.­ Based­ on­ our­
reasoning,­ we­ expect­ that­ participants­ will­ only­
use­ social­ information­ that­ is­ instrumental­ to­
achieving­coordination­success­(i.e.,­ information­
that­ is­ associated­ with­ the­ available­ choice­
options),­while­ ignoring­ social­ information­ that­
appears­ irrelevant.­ More­ specifically,­ we­ only­
expect­participants’­decisions­to­be­influenced­by­
social­ information­ that­ is­ associated­ with­ the­
available­choice­options­(Hypothesis­5).
Method





ulty:­ Shared­ vs.­ Unshared)­ between-participants­
factorial­ design­was­ used.­The­participants­were­
paid­€­3­for­their­participation.
Procedure­ The­ procedure­ used­ in­ this­ study­
was­very­similar­to­the­one­used­in­Study­1.­Again,­
we­ presented­ participants­ with­ a­ Schelling-type­
matching­ game­ (cf.­ Schelling,­ 1960).­ This­ time,­
however,­ participants­ were­ not­ presented­ with­
three­colors,­but­with­three­University­buildings,­
i.e.,­ the­Social­Sciences­Faculty,­ the­Law­Faculty­
and­ the­ Central­ University­ Library.3­ They­ were­
asked­ to­each­pick­one­of ­ these­ three­buildings­
and­they­were­told­that­if ­they­succeeded­in­both­
picking­ the­ same­ building,­ they­ would­ have­ a­
chance­of ­winning­a­monetary­amount­of ­€­20.
Participants­ were­ randomly­ assigned­ to­ four­
between-participants­ conditions.­ Whereas­ in­
Study­ 1­ participants­ only­ received­ information­
about­the­sex­of ­their­co-player­(i.e.,­Shared­Sex­
vs.­Unshared­Sex),­in­the­present­study­they­also­
received­ information­about­ the­ faculty­at­which­
their­ co-player­ studied­ (i.e.,­ Shared­ Faculty­ vs.­
Unshared­Faculty).­In­the­Shared­Faculty­condi-
tion,­ participants­ were­ informed­ that­ their­ co-
player­ studied­ at­ the­ same­ Faculty­ as­ they­
themselves­ (i.e.,­ the­ Faculty­ of ­ Social­ Sciences)­
and­ that­ their­ co-player­ also­ knew­ this.­ In­ the­
Unshared­ Faculty­ condition,­ participants­ were­
informed­that­their­co-player­studied­at­the­Law­






lasted­ about­ 20­ minutes,­ all­ participants­ were­
debriefed,­thanked­and­paid­equally­for­their­par-
ticipation­ (i.e.,­ each­ participant­ received­ €­ 3).­
Furthermore,­three­prizes­of ­€­20­were­randomly­
allotted­ among­ the­participants.­All­ participants­
agreed­to­this­payment­procedure.
Results
Manipulation check­ To­ check­ whether­ par-
ticipants­ had­ understood­ the­ experimental­
manipulations,­ afterwards­ they­ were­ asked­ to­
indicate­whether­their­co-player­was­a­man­or­a­
woman­ and­ at­ which­ Faculty­ their­ co-player­
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The participants’ choices­ In­ line­ with­




=­ 0.56,­ p­ =­ .75.­ These­ findings­ indicate­ that­
choices­were­influenced­by­information­about­the­
study­ of ­ the­ co-player,­ but­ not­ by­ information­
about­the­sex­of ­the­co-player.­Additionally,­in­line­
with­the­findings­of ­Study­1,­in­the­Shared­Faculty­
condition,­ participants­ chose­ their­ own­ Faculty­
most­frequently,­namely­42­out­of ­45­times,­χ2­(2,­








that­ social­ information­ influences­ decisions­ in­
coordination­situations­when­there­is­a­clear­asso-
ciation­between­such­information­and­the­availa-
ble­ choice­ options,­ and­ that­ irrelevant­ social­
information­ does­ not­ influence­ decisions­







acteristics,­ they­ opt­ for­ more­ category-neutral­
choices­instead.
Study 4
















opt­ for­ blue­ when­ trying­ to­ coordinate­ with­
another­male­participant,­it­automatically­follows­
that­opting­ for­blue­ is­ a­ successful­ strategy­and­
opting­ for­pink­ is­not.­But­does­ this­also­ imply­
that­ male­ participants­ opt­ for­ blue­ because­ they­
want­ to­be­ successful­ in­ tacit­ coordination?­We­
think­that­it­does,­and­of ­course­our­findings­that­






Shared Shared 22 0 1
­ Unshared 3 15 5
Unshared Shared 20 1 1
­ Unshared 3 16 3
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male­ participants­ opted­ for­ a­ sex-neutral­ color­
(yellow)­when­trying­to­match­their­choices­with­
a­female­participant­do­fit­with­this­idea­of ­suc-
cess-driven­ choices.­ Nevertheless,­ because­ the­
success­of ­a­strategy­can­only­be­indirectly­derived­
from­observing­choices,­it­may­be­worthwhile­to­







people­ select­ the­ partner­ that­ would­ maximize­
their­chances­of ­success.­To­ investigate­ this,­we­
relied­on­the­findings­we­obtained­in­Studies­1–3.­
Here­we­observed­that­sharedness­enhanced­suc-
cessful­ coordination­ in­ matching­ tasks,­ and­
unsharedness­ enhanced­ successful­ coordination­
in­mismatching­tasks.­Now,­if ­these­findings­were­
indeed­the­result­of ­a­deliberate­process­such­that­
participants­ anticipated­ and­ incorporated­ the­
chances­of ­success­when­making­their­decisions,­
one­ might­ expect­ that­ participants­ should­ also­









whether­ people­ really­ understand­ how­ social­
information,­by­providing­unambiguous­cues­for­
which­option­to­choose,­can­facilitate­coordina-
tion­ success.­More­ specifically,­ with­ this­ proce-
dure­ we­ can­ test­ whether­ people­ realize­ that­
sharedness­ can­ facilitate­ matching,­ whereas­
unsharedness­can­facilitate­mismatching.





tate­ successful­ mismatching,­ they­ will­ prefer­ a­
co-player­ who­ is­ different­ from­ themselves­
(Hypothesis­7).­And­finally,­in­line­with­findings­
from­ Study­ 3,­we­ expect­ that­ the­ two­ previous­
hypotheses­only­hold­when­there­is­a­clear­asso-
ciation­ between­ the­ co-players’­ characteristics­
and­the­available­choice­options­(Hypothesis­8).­
Given­the­fact­that­we­have­shown­in­the­previ-
ous­ studies­ that­ successful­ matching­ requires­
shared­ characteristics­ and­ that­ successful­ mis-
matching­ requires­ unshared­ characteristics,­ we­
expect­that­players­will­choose­a­potential­co-player­
based­ only­ on­ relevant­ social­ information­ (i.e.,­
social­information­that­provides­useful­informa-
tion­ regarding­ the­available­ choice­options)­ and­







Procedure­ The­ experimental­ procedure­ of ­
this­study­was­similar­to­the­procedure­of ­the­first­
three­studies.­Again,­participants­were­presented­
with­ a­ coordination­ game,­ this­ time­ a­ game­ in­
which­two­players­were­asked­to­choose­a­color.­
The­colors­they­could­choose­from­were­pink­and­
blue,­ pink­ being­ associated­with­ the­ female­ sex­
and­ blue­ being­ associated­ with­ the­ male­ sex­
(Brabandt­&­Mooney,­ 1989;­ Zucker­&­Bradley,­
1995).­ Participants­ were­ randomly­ assigned­ to­
two­ experimental­ conditions:­ a­matching­ and­ a­
mismatching­ condition.­ In­ the­matching­ condi-
tion,­they­were­told­that­if ­they­succeeded­in­both­
picking­the­same­color,­they­would­have­a­chance­
of ­winning­a­monetary­amount­of ­€­20.­ In­ the­
mismatching­ condition,­ by­ contrast,­ they­ were­
told­that­if ­they­succeeded­in­both­picking­a­dif-
ferent­ color,­ they­would­have­ a­ chance­of ­win-
ning­a­monetary­amount­of ­€­20.
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studied­at­a­different­faculty,­or­a­fellow­partici-








lasted­ about­ 20­ minutes,­ all­ participants­ were­
debriefed,­thanked­and­paid­equally­for­their­par-
ticipation­ (i.e.,­ each­ participant­ received­ €­ 3).­
Furthermore,­three­prizes­of ­€­20­were­randomly­
allotted­ among­ the­participants.­All­ participants­
agreed­to­this­payment­procedure.
Results
Manipulation check­ To­ check­ whether­ par-
ticipants­ had­ understood­ the­ experimental­
manipulation,­afterwards­they­were­asked­to­indi-
cate­ what­ the­ coordination­ requirement­ of ­ the­
game­was:­(a)­to­choose­the­same­color­as­their­
co-player­or­ (b)­ to­ choose­ a­different­ color.­All­
participants­ answered­ this­ question­ correctly,­
which­indicates­that­they­had­all­understood­and­
remembered­the­coordination­requirements.




with­our­hypotheses,­ in­ the­matching­ condition­
most­participants­preferred­a­co-player­who­was­
of ­the­same­sex­as­they­themselves,­χ2­(1,­N­=­51)­
=­ 14.29,­ p­<­ .001,­whereas­ in­ the­mismatching­
condition­most­participants­preferred­a­co-player­




hypotheses.­ As­ expected,­ when­ matching­ was­
required­ people­ preferred­ co-players­ who­ were­
similar­ to­ themselves­ (Hypothesis­ 6),­ whereas­
when­mismatching­was­required­people­preferred­
co-players­who­were­different­(Hypothesis­7),­but­
only­ when­ the­ respective­ characteristics­ were­
associated­ with­ the­ available­ choice­ options­
(Hypothesis­8).­These­findings­suggest­that­peo-
ple­ indeed­ realize­ that­ social­ information­ can­
serve­ as­ an­ effective­ cue­ for­ tacit­ coordination.­
Participants’­ co-player­ preferences­ seemed­ to­
reflect­ the­ notion­ that­ whereas­ sharedness­ can­




light­ on­ the­ role­ of ­ social­ information­ in­ tacit­
coordination.­Whereas­earlier­research­has­prima-
rily­focused­on­how­characteristics­of ­the­coordi-
nation­ task­ itself ­ influence­ people’s­ decisions­
(e.g.,­ Bacharach­ &­ Bernasconi,­ 1997;­ Schelling,­
1960),­the­present­research­provided­a­first­step­
towards­ showing­ how­ social­ information­ may­
also­play­ a­ role­ in­ this­process.­By­ investigating­
this,­we­presented­a­social-psychological­perspec-
tive­on­the­topic­of ­tacit­coordination.
In­ a­ series­ of ­ four­ experiments,­ we­ showed­
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research­ is­ the­ first­ to­ demonstrate­ that­ social­
information­may­serve­as­an­effective­cue­for­tacit­
coordination.­Furthermore,­we­ showed­ that­ the­
way­in­which­social­information­influences­choice­
behavior­ largely­ depends­ on­ the­ coordination­
requirements.­When­matching­is­required,­people­
use­the­sharedness­of ­characteristics­as­a­basis­for­
their­ decisions,­ whereas­ when­ mismatching­ is­
required,­people­use­the­unsharedness­of ­charac-





social­ information­ when­ they­ determine­ their­
choices.­We­obtained­support­for­this­reasoning­
by­ not­ only­ focusing­ on­ participants’­ actual­
choice­ behavior­ in­ coordination­ games­ (see­
Studies­ 1–3),­ but­ also­ on­ their­ preferences­ for­
potential­co-players­(see­Study­4).­In­the­follow-
ing,­we­will­ discuss­ the­ general­ implications­ of ­
these­findings.
Social information and salience
As­we­mentioned­in­the­introduction­of ­this­arti-
cle,­Schelling­(1960)­argued­that­people­use­sali-
ence­ to­determine­ their­ choices­ in­coordination­
games,­ and­ he­ demonstrated­ that­ people­ often­
choose­the­option­that­“sticks­out”­from­the­rest.­
The­present­ research­now­shows­ that­ such­sali-
ence­ is­ not­ only­ determined­ by­ features­ of ­ the­
choice­ options­ themselves­ (i.e.,­ environmental­
characteristics),­but­also­by­the­information­that­






different­ types­ of ­ salience­ to­ tacitly­ coordinate­
their­decisions.­They­distinguished­three­types­of ­
salience.­ First,­ people­ may­ simply­ choose­ the­
option­that­is­salient­for­themselves.­This­type­of ­
salience­ is­ called­primary salience,­ and­Mehta­et­ al.­
argued­that­for­people­from­the­same­cultural­back-
ground,­ the­ same­ labels­ have­ primary­ salience,­
which­may­explain­why­tacit­coordination­is­often­
successful­ among­people­ from­ the­ same­popula-
tion.­Second,­people­may­base­their­decisions­on­




that­ is­ salient­ for­ all­players­ (cf.­Schelling,­1960).­
This­third­type­of ­salience­is­called­Schelling salience.
Mehta­et­al.­(1994)­conducted­an­experiment­
to­ test­ which­ of ­ these­ three­ types­ of ­ salience­
people­use­in­coordination­games.­They­showed­
that­when­participants­were­asked­to­individually­
pick­ an­ option,­ they­ often­ picked­ a­ different­
option­than­when­they­were­asked­to­coordinate­
their­ decisions­ with­ an­ anonymous­ co-player.­
According­to­Mehta­et­al.,­these­findings­indicate­
that­people­do­not­use­primary­salience­as­a­basis­
for­ their­ decisions­ in­ coordination­ games,­ but­
instead­ use­ secondary­ or­ Schelling­ salience.­






The­ present­ research­ provides­ a­ tentative­
answer­ to­ this­ question,­ namely­ that­ people­ use­
Schelling­salience­to­tacitly­coordinate­their­deci-
sions.­ Our­ findings­ suggest­ that­ people­ do­ not­
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Diversity and successful mismatching
In­the­literature­on­tacit­coordination­(e.g.,­Mehta­
et­al.,­1994;­Schelling,­1960),­it­has­repeatedly­been­
argued­ that­people­ from­the­ same­cultural­back-
ground­may­be­better­at­coordinating­ their­deci-
sions­because­they­share­the­same­conventions­(cf.­






be­ beneficial­ to­ tacit­ coordination.­ It­ should­ be­
noted,­ however,­ that­ even­ in­ mismatching­ situa-
tions,­ shared­ knowledge­ about­ another’s­ cultural­
background­may­be­necessary­for­diversity­to­facili-




associated­ with­ which­ characteristics­ (e.g.,­ which­
color­ is­ associated­ with­ which­ sex),­ which­ may­








to­ look­ not­ only­ at­ matching­ situations,­ which­
have­traditionally­received­a­lot­of ­attention­in­the­
economic­ literature,­ but­ also­ to­ focus­ on­ situa-
tions­in­which­mismatching­is­required.­We­dem-
onstrated­that­matching­and­mismatching­games,­
although­ hardly­ ever­ distinguished­ in­ the­ litera-
ture,­ are­ very­ different­ psychologically­ (see­ also­
Abele­&­Stasser,­2008).











tion­ partner,­ thereby­ testing­ whether­ and­ how­
they­ would­ use­ the­ provided­ information­ to­
achieve­ coordination­ success.­Of ­ course,­ in­ the­









alizability­ of ­ the­ present­ findings,­ it­ would­ be­
good­if ­future­research­set­out­to­investigate­this­







have­ presented­ converging­ evidence­ that­ people­
not­ only­ focus­ on­ environmental­ characteristics­
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